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AbstrAct
Background Healthcare systems worldwide are 
concerned with strengthening board-level governance of 
quality. We applied Lozeau, Langley and Denis’ typology 
(transformation, customisation, loose coupling and 
corruption) to describe and explain the organisational 
response to an improvement intervention in six hospital 
boards in England.
Methods We conducted fieldwork over a 30-month 
period as part of an evaluation in six healthcare provider 
organisations in England. Our data comprised board 
member interviews (n=54), board meeting observations 
(24 hours) and relevant documents.
Results Two organisations transformed their 
processes in a way that was consistent with the 
objectives of the intervention, and one customised 
the intervention with positive effects. In two further 
organisations, the intervention was only loosely coupled 
with organisational processes, and participation in 
the intervention stopped when it competed with 
other initiatives. In the final case, the intervention 
was corrupted to reinforce existing organisational 
processes (a focus on external regulatory requirements). 
The organisational response was contingent on the 
availability of ’slack’—expressed by participants as the 
’space to think’ and ’someone to do the doing’—and 
the presence of a functioning board.
Conclusions Underperforming organisations, under 
pressure to improve, have little time or resources to 
devote to organisation-wide quality improvement 
initiatives. Our research highlights the need for 
policy-makers and regulators to extend their focus 
beyond the choice of intervention, to consider how 
the chosen intervention will be implemented in public 
sector hospitals, how this will vary between contexts 
and with what effects. We provide useful information 
on the necessary conditions for a board-level quality 
improvement intervention to have positive effects.
IntroductIon
Worldwide, healthcare systems are 
concerned with strengthening board-
level governance of quality.1–3 In 
England, national healthcare regulators 
are developing approaches, resources 
and interventions aimed at supporting 
senior hospital leaders in their role in 
the governance of quality.4 5 There is 
increasing recognition of the value of 
organisational theory for understanding 
the implementation of quality improve-
ment (QI) interventions.6 7 In this study, 
we apply organisational theory8 to 
describe and explain the response of 
healthcare provider organisations to a 
board-level QI intervention aimed at 
supporting senior hospital leaders to 
develop an organisation-wide QI strategy. 
We adopt a contingent approach9 
concerned with identifying the critical 
variables that influence an organisation’s 
response to a QI intervention.
organisational responses to QI 
interventions
We are not aware of any previous studies 
of board-level interventions in the public 
healthcare sector. Looking at the effec-
tiveness of improvement interventions 
more generally, a number of studies 
have explored how the cultural, struc-
tural and political characteristics of the 
adopting organisation shape its response. 
These contextual factors may create 
difficulties in embedding and sustaining 
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Table 1 Organisational responses to a quality improvement 
intervention8
Response
Transformation The organisation modifies its processes with the result 
that the intervention has the intended effect.
Customisation The organisation adapts the intervention in the process 
of changing organisational processes.
Loose coupling The intervention is implemented in a superficial way 
with organisational processes remaining largely 
unaffected.
Corruption The intervention becomes captured and distorted 
to reinforce existing organisational roles and power 
structures.
changes to practices, and produce unintended conse-
quences.8 10–14
In their study of the introduction and impact of 
management interventions in publicly funded health-
care organisations in Canada, Lozeau, Langley and 
Denis8 argue that as interventions introduced into 
public sector hospitals are often borrowed from the 
private sector, there is a ‘compatibility gap’ between 
the assumptions underlying the design of the interven-
tion and the characteristics of the adopting organisa-
tion. For example, the adoption of ‘strategic planning’ 
by an organisation assumes that senior leaders have 
the autonomy to make and implement decisions. This 
assumption may be incompatible with public sector 
hospitals, where leadership is fragmented, power 
diffuse and where there are multiple goals (eg, patient 
care and cost control). The compatibility gap produces 
a mismatch between the intended and actual use of the 
intervention. From their findings, Lozeau et al devel-
oped a typology of possible organisational responses 
(table 1).
Research in the National Health Service (NHS) in 
England10 13 found that in addition to ‘bottom-up’ 
corruption from professionals within the organi-
sation, interventions can also undergo ‘top-down’ 
corruption, driven by the demands of central govern-
ment. When the intended objectives of the interven-
tion were to promote education, collaboration and 
knowledge sharing, these were displaced by the quan-
tifiable outcomes prioritised by central government. 
This research also found an erosion of staff engage-
ment with the intervention over time.10 This was not 
a case of staff ‘resistance’, as there was no evidence of 
resistance to the improvement goals per se, rather it 
involved
an unwillingness (or, rather, inability) to be actively 
involved in improvement work unless supported by 
the provision of protected time and recruitment of 
additional clinical members of staff, neither of which 
is possible without substantial financial investment. (p. 
1178).
The compatibility gap highlighted by studies of NHS 
organisations in England relates to the differences 
between relatively autonomous private sector organ-
isations and public sector organisations that operate 
in a target-driven, policy-dependent and resource-con-
strained context.
We contribute to this literature by analysing the 
responses of six hospital boards to an improvement 
intervention. In contrast to previous research, outlined 
above, this intervention was developed specifically for 
public sector hospitals, based on research on mainly 
publicly funded hospitals.15 16 We addressed the 
following questions: (1) How do public sector hospital 
boards respond to a QI intervention, and what are the 
effects? (2) How do features of the wider social and 
political context shape the response? (3) What are the 
implications for the future design and implementation 
of interventions aimed at enhancing the capability of 
boards to improve the quality of patient care?
Intervention
The intervention facilitated the use of a research-based 
guide for senior hospital leaders to develop and imple-
ment organisation-wide QI strategies.15 The guide is 
based on findings from the QUASER study of quality 
in hospitals, a collaboration between five European 
countries (England, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, 
Portugal) funded by the EU FP7 programme.17 The 
use of the guide was facilitated in six provider organ-
isations by Foresight Partnership (an organisational 
development consultancy), now part of GE Health-
care, between July 2014 and May 2015. The interven-
tion involved a self-assessment questionnaire, which 
was completed by both executive and non-executive 
members of the board (10–12 in each organisation). 
Each organisation nominated three board members to 
attend a series of learning events. In addition to devel-
oping an organisation-wide QI strategy, participants 
were given the task of implementing one organisa-
tion-wide QI project. More information on the inter-
vention is provided in the supplementary material.
Methods
We report findings from a qualitative study, under-
taken between April 2014 and December 2016, as 
part of an evaluation of the intervention. Qualitative 
methods are appropriate for our research questions 
which are concerned with understanding how, and 
why, the intervention worked (or not) to distill lessons 
that can be applied to future interventions.18 We used 
a combination of methods (interviews with partici-
pants, observations of board meetings and document 
analysis) to triangulate our findings and provide an 
in-depth contextualised understanding of the process 
of organisational improvement.
sample
Nine organisations in an urban/suburban area were 
invited to participate in the intervention as part of 
a research study, of which six agreed. The fee for 
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Table 2 Profiles of participating organisations
1 2 3 4 5 6
Type Acute Mental health Acute Acute Acute Acute
Foundation trust* Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Performance (as rated by the 
national regulator)
Outstanding Requires improvement Requires improvement Good Requires improvement Good
*In England, the majority of healthcare providers are now ‘foundation trusts’ (142/242, 62%). Foundation trusts are, in principle, granted greater 
autonomy over finances and service development than non-foundation trust providers.
Table 3 Summary of data collection
Period Methods
Before (T1): April 2014 to July 
2014
Interviews with between 4 and 6 members of each participating board (n=30)
Observation (1 meeting of each board)
Document analysis of papers from the meeting we observed and an additional set of minutes; Quality Accounts (a 
mandatory report on the quality of services provided by an organisation and published annually); rolling 5-year strategy; 
quality committee minutes; inspection reports from national regulators
During (T2): July 2014 to April 
2015
Observation (workshop and action learning sets)
Interviews with 1–2 participants from each board (n=9)
After (T3): May 2015 to 
December 2016
Repeat interviews with board members, where these individuals were still in post and willing to participate (n=24), and 
any additional staff members leading on the development and implementation of the nominated project (n=2)
Observation (1 meeting of each board)
Document analysis of meeting papers and other relevant documents, as in T1. We also requested documents—reports, 
PowerPoint presentations etc—relating to the implementation of the nominated project
participating for each organisation was £5000 (paid 
to Foresight as a contribution to the cost of providing 
the intervention). Boards were offered an alternative 
programme that provided a more bespoke and inten-
sive form of consultancy at a higher cost, but all opted 
for the lower cost option. The profiles of participating 
organisations are given in table 2.
data collection
Data were collected across three phases—‘before’, 
‘during’ and ‘after’ the intervention (table 3). At each 
time period, we observed board meetings, taking 
notes on what was discussed, by whom and for how 
long, together with descriptions of interactions and 
our interpretation of board dynamics. We also inter-
viewed members of the board. We asked boards to 
nominate members to be interviewed, both execu-
tive and non-executive, including the non-executive 
director responsible for quality. Interviews, which 
were audio-recorded and transcribed, were semis-
tructured on the topic of governance of QI. Inter-
views conducted during and after the intervention 
asked participants about their views and experiences 
of the intervention and their progress with the tasks 
(developing an organisation-wide QI strategy and 
development and implementation of one organisa-
tion-wide QI project). We collected a range of docu-
ments for each organisation (board meeting papers, 
annual reports, Quality Accounts, project reports and 
PowerPoint presentations) for additional information 
on the extent to which organisations had developed 
an organisation-wide QI strategy and the nature of QI 
activities.
Analysis
During an initial phase of data familiarisation, LJ 
suggested that Lozeau, Langley and Denis’ model 
would be a helpful conceptual framework for anal-
ysis. Having established an empirical fit with this 
model, subsequent analysis focused on describing and 
explaining the response of the organisations in our 
study to the intervention, and explicating the contin-
gencies which shaped this response. Data were organ-
ised in a table, using the procedures for framework 
analysis.19 LJ then drafted a narrative for each case, as 
recommended for studies of organisational processes.20 
These were interpretive accounts developed from the 
raw data (interview accounts, board observations and 
documents), describing the response of each organisa-
tion to the intervention and suggesting analytical link-
ages between the organisational response and contex-
tual features. The table and narratives were circulated 
and discussed among the research team.
FIndIngs
Responses to the intervention varied across the 
organisations in our study. Two organisations trans-
formed work processes in response to the interven-
tion. These organisations responded to the interven-
tion as intended, producing an organisation-wide 
QI strategy, and made substantial progress imple-
menting one organisation-wide QI project. One 
organisation customised the intervention, with a 
positive consequence in the form of accomplishing 
locally identified priorities for QI. In two of the 
remaining organisations, the response could be char-
acterised as loose coupling with no positive effects 
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attributable to the intervention. In the final organ-
isation, the intervention was corrupted by external 
regulatory demands (see online supplementary table 
S2 for detail). We found that the response of organ-
isations to the intervention was contingent on two 
main contextual features, the availability of ‘slack’ 
and the functioning of the board. These features are 
elaborated below. Data extracts have been chosen to 
illustrate our findings.
slack
In our study, ‘slack’ comprised positive conditions 
for both thought and action. These two components 
were frequently referred to by participants in our 
study as having ‘thinking space’ and ‘someone to do 
the doing’. The amount of slack that was available 
to organisations was shaped by the extent to which 
organisations were compliant with national stand-
ards, such as the Department of Health’s standard 
for a maximum of 4 hours patient waiting time in 
accident and emergency (A&E) departments. Where 
organisations had not met external standards, activ-
ities were focused on meeting these, and the organi-
sation faced increased pressure from external bodies, 
such as commissioners and regulators. This reduced 
their autonomy and placed additional demands and 
requirements on the organisation, such as additional 
reporting, and attendance at meetings with external 
organisations. The autonomy gained from meeting 
national standards also facilitated the acquisition 
of funds for QI. For example, organisation 1 was 
able to negotiate with the commissioner dedicated 
funding for QI initiatives. This provided funding for 
additional staff to ‘do the doing’.
Where organisations lacked thinking space or 
capacity for action, the response to the interven-
tion diverged from what was intended. For example, 
organisation 3 was not compliant with a number of 
national standards and in the year prior to the inter-
vention it had been placed in ‘special measures’ by 
the national regulator. This is a process imposed on 
organisations when the overall service, or certain 
core services, have been rated ‘inadequate’. The 
organisation is required to follow an externally 
imposed ‘improvement plan’ and is subject to a 
follow-up review to assess performance against the 
plan. This organisation also faced severe financial 
constraints and lacked key resources. For example, 
as a result of a previous cost cutting exercise, all clin-
ical governance posts had been removed. Although 
initial engagement with the intervention was strong, 
the key stumbling block was finding someone to ‘do 
the doing’, especially in relation to developing and 
implementing an organisation-wide QI project.
The intervention competed with the improvement 
plan imposed by the regulator which was clearly the 
top priority for the organisation. This was explicit 
in the interview accounts following the intervention:
So what I am trying to say is basically in the scheme 
of things if this was helping me get out of special 
measures the answer would be absolutely I would be 
there. At the moment it’s not helping me get out of 
special measures. (Chair, T3)
Following the intervention, the organisation was 
allocated, by central government, to an alternative 
organisational development initiative. Thus, despite 
the intervention having apparent traction with 
senior leaders, and strong initial engagement, it was 
dislodged by competing priorities and eventually 
displaced by another initiative imposed by central 
government.
Organisation 5 was also struggling to meet a 
number of national standards. As a non-foundation 
trust, the organisation was subject to performance 
management from the NHS hierarchy and additional 
reporting requirements from a range of external 
agencies. In this case, the intervention was subsumed 
into externally driven imperatives for quality assur-
ance and the application for foundation trust status 
(see table 2). Analysis of documents revealed that 
the intervention was used primarily to prepare the 
required documents for the foundation trust appli-
cation. Implementation of an organisation-wide QI 
project stalled when the organisation failed to meet 
the A&E access targets. At the same time, the national 
regulator inspected the A&E department and rated it 
inadequate, requiring the organisation to submit an 
improvement plan to the regulator.
In the case of organisation 6, the intervention was 
one of a large number of quality and safety initia-
tives that the organisation was participating in. The 
intervention was seen as ‘just another initiative’, 
separate to other QI projects, and attended to in a 
superficial way. Over time, commitment to the inter-
vention was diluted as it competed with other initia-
tives for participants’ time and attention, reflected 
in declining attendance at the learning events (see 
online supplementary table S1). When it came to 
implementing an organisation-wide QI project, a 
number of existing initiatives were ‘re-labelled’21 as 
the nominated project for the intervention. There 
was no evidence that the intervention modified 
organisational processes.
Functioning of the board
The organisations that benefited from the interven-
tion had stable leadership and a shared vision for QI. 
In contrast, organisation 3 had a history of organisa-
tional turbulence and lacked stable leadership due to 
continuous turnover of the executive and non-exec-
utive teams. Staff who took up executive roles on the 
board were often referred to as ‘holding the fort’ and 
‘stepping up’. This suggests an important ‘compat-
ibility gap’, between the assumption, in a board-
level QI intervention, that there is a coherent and 
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functioning governing entity, and the reality, which 
in the case of organisation 3 was a fluid collection of 
individuals with temporary responsibilities. This gap, 
between the board as imagined in the intervention, 
and the board in practice, was referred to directly by 
the chair during an interview:
What you have here is a bit different from the normal 
board, you have got very experienced non exec 
directors, not so experienced executive directors. So 
therefore the board is not like the board written about 
in a Foresight kind of document, it’s very much like 
seasoned operators with people who have stepped up 
to take a very tricky job. (Chair, T3)
Organisation 5 had poor relationships between 
board members, especially between the medical 
director and the director of nursing, and between the 
medical director and the director of operations. In 
the year following the intervention, key members of 
the board, including the medical director, the CEO 
and the chair, left the organisation. At 12-month 
follow-up, none of the members of the board who 
had participated in the intervention remained at the 
organisation.
Organisation 6 also lacked a functioning board. 
One executive director claimed that decision-making 
happened entirely at the level of the Executive 
Board, with the Board of Directors serving only to 
ratify the decisions of the executive team. Both inter-
view accounts and board observations suggested that 
the Board of Directors played no effective role in 
debating decisions, developing strategy, or in scruti-
nising and challenging the performance of the organ-
isation. One interviewee suggested that the board was 
a performance, noting that ‘everything at the board 
is highly rehearsed’ (medical director, T1). Interview 
accounts suggested that the response to the inter-
vention reflected a broader organisational strategy 
of superficially or ritualistically attending to gover-
nance of QI, as the director of nursing observed, ‘I 
think we play at it’ (T1).
dIscussIon
We found that the organisational response to a board-
level QI intervention was contingent on the availa-
bility of slack and the functioning of the board. Slack 
has previously been found to play an important role 
in improving organisational performance, enabling 
organisations to initiate strategy and proactively 
adopt innovations.22 In relation to QI, slack has been 
defined as the ‘cushion of resources within an organ-
isation that facilitates innovation and change by 
providing crucial time and support for learning and 
creativity to occur’ (p. 102).23 Research on hospi-
tals that have sustained QI has stressed that ‘slack is 
not a ‘surplus’ or a ‘luxury’ but something that has 
to be built into an organisation for it to continually 
support innovation and improvement’ (p. 107). The 
implications of our research for regulators concerned 
with strengthening board-level governance of quality 
is that they need to take slack seriously and reduce 
accordingly the number of demands on organisa-
tions. Organisations considering engaging in this 
type of initiative might first consider what they could 
‘stop doing’ to enable sufficient slack. Our study 
suggests that simply adding one more initiative to an 
already overburdened organisation will not produce 
the desired results.
Organisations considering engaging in a board-
level QI initiative also need to ensure that there is in 
fact a board. We found that there was not always a 
coherent and functioning governing body. In organ-
isation 3, for example, there was what we have 
termed a ‘nominal board’. In this organisation, a 
very high turnover of board membership resulted in 
available staff ‘stepping up’ to fill a board-level role 
in the absence of alternative candidates, resulting in 
a board ‘in name only’. In organisation 6, there was 
what we have termed a ‘staged board’. In this organ-
isation, the board of directors was a performance of 
decisions that had already been made by the execu-
tive directors. While governance practices often have 
a performative dimension,24 we use the category 
‘staged board’ to denote a governing body charac-
terised by a cynical focus on display, and control of 
information, and where insufficient trust and open-
ness inhibits challenge, debate and effective action.
Recent research has highlighted the extent of 
‘churn’ in board membership in England.25 A study 
of 145 provider organisations found that vacan-
cies in the executive team were widespread, and 
the median tenure of an executive director was 3 
years. In low-performing organisations (as rated by 
the national regulator), 14% of posts were vacant 
and 72% of executives had been appointed in the 
previous year. In comparison, in high-performing 
organisations, only 3% of posts were vacant and 
20% of executives had been appointed within the 
past year. The study found that the problem is exac-
erbated by a tendency, on the part of some national 
bodies and politicians, to ‘personalise’ poor perfor-
mance, making it harder to recruit individuals to 
these roles.
The consequences of churn include a focus on 
day-to-day priorities at the expense of longer-term 
strategy. High turnover can also stall organisational 
and service development, and short tenures under-
mine the credibility executive directors have with 
staff in their own organisations and with external 
stakeholders. There is, therefore, an important 
role for regional and national bodies in supporting 
senior leaders and developing their capabilities.25 
However, while these measures may help to address 
the problem of the ‘nominal board’, remedying a 
‘staged’ board is likely to be more challenging. In 
our case, the functioning of the board was prevented 
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by the unproductive use of power by long-standing 
individuals. Our findings can inform the design of 
board-level interventions, which should be adapted 
to the context of individual organisations, for 
example, by focusing on developing the building 
blocks of healthy board functioning in organisations 
where this is weak.
Our findings support those of previous empirical 
studies in showing how a QI intervention can be 
corrupted by the demands of the centre (in this case 
the Department of Health and other national bodies 
which set systems for regulation and performance 
management). Our findings indicate an incompat-
ibility between an intervention that aims to foster 
learning and develop long-term strategy for QI, and 
the short term-focus required by the procedures put 
in place by national bodies for assurance.
In the case of organisation 3, participation in the 
intervention was only loosely coupled with organi-
sational dynamics; however, this did not involve, as 
previous studies describe it, a superficial or ritual-
istic participation in the intervention. Rather, indi-
viduals were prevented from taking any action due 
to an absence of necessary slack. We suggest that, in 
the context of public sector hospitals, loose coupling 
can be understood as inaction or ‘stalling’, as well 
as the more familiar superficial or ritualistic action. 
This inaction can also be induced by the centre, as 
when the Department of Health intervened to allo-
cate organisation 3 to a new, national initiative.
A limitation of our study was that the majority of 
data collection was at board level. This ‘top-down’ 
focus neglects the influence of other features of 
the organisational context, such as the professional 
workforce.8
conclusIon
Underperforming organisations, under pressure to 
improve, have little time or resources to devote to 
organisation-wide initiatives such as those described 
here, highlighting a paradox in that the organisations 
most in need of such interventions are unlikely to 
benefit from them. Our research highlights the need 
for policy-makers and regulators to extend their 
focus beyond the choice of intervention, to consider 
how the chosen intervention will be implemented in 
public sector hospitals, how this will vary between 
contexts and with what effects. We provide useful 
information on the necessary conditions for a board-
level QI intervention to have positive effects.
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